Should emergence be taken as a merely ‘epistemic' phenomenon, or as an ontological one?

In our early readings, Hempel, by relativizing attributions of emergence to particular theories, may seem to be treating it as at best epistemic. While Searle, by taking emergence to be a real causal phenomenon exhibited by systems, with occurrences of emergent phenomena existing as causal products of the causal relations taking place among underlying constitutive elements of the system, seem to be treating it as ontological.

Note that Searle hypothesizes that conscious phenomena emerge from neurophysiological goings-on in the brain, and so hypothesizes this in advance of any such theoretical account. He argues for this possibility merely by analogy with other, better understood, ‘bottom-up' causal phenomena. Still, he can be interpreted as wanting such a theory, and suggesting where to look for it, and what sort of ‘causal topology' it would posit in the world by way of explaining consciousness.

So, might that suggest a possible rapprochement between Hempel and Searle what are the ontological status and explanatory role of emergent phenomena? Discuss.

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