Question: Tyson v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13973 (S.D. Ind. 2004)

Employee, a Muslim, was terminated, in part, for using an empty patient room bathroom to perform her religiously required preprayer ablutions of washing her hands, feet, and forehead, while at work. She also alleged the employer failed to reasonably accommodate her praying up to three times per day at work as required by her religion. The court held that the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the employee's religious conflict as to the ablutions, but not the prayer.

Hamilton, J.

Employee Fatou Tyson, a Muslim woman, worked as a Patient Service Assistant at Methodist Hospital, which is operated by defendant Clarian Health Partners. Clarian fired Tyson while she was still a probationary employee in her first six months of employment. Tyson has sued Clarian under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming [among other things] that it failed to reasonably accommodate her religion. Tyson is a Muslim . Her religion calls for her to pray five times a day. The times at which she was required to pray varied somewhat over the course of her employment, but generally three of her daily prayer sessions coincided with her work shift at the hospital. Before she prayed, Tyson engaged in a religious cleaning ritual known as ablution.

Typically, ablution takes two to three minutes and involves cleaning the feet, hands, and forehead. Title VII imposes on employers a duty to provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee's religious beliefs and observances unless the employer can show it is unable to do so without undue hardship. To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination by failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that:

(1) she follows a bona fide religious practice that conflicts with an employment requirement;

(2) she brought the practice to the employer's attention; and

(3) the religious practice was the basis for an adverse employment action.

The employer Case2 may respond to the prima facie case by proving either that it offered a reasonable accommodation that the employee did not accept, or that it was unable to provide a reasonable accommodation without undue hardship. The employer bears the burden of proof on these issues. An employee is not required to propose a specific accommodation. As to the prayer issue, the parties agree on the essential facts, which show that Clarian accommodated Tyson's religious practice of prayer. Approximately a week into her employment with Clarian, Tyson told [her supervisor] Rios that she was a Muslim and would need to pray as many as three times during her work shift. Rios said that was "okay," and he showed her the hospital's two non-denominational chapels where she could pray. The undisputed evidence shows that Clarian offered and Tyson accepted a reasonable accommodation that enabled her to pursue her practice of prayer throughout the course of her employment. A reasonable accommodation of an employee's religion is one that "eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices."

"Title VII requires only ‘reasonable accommodation,' not satisfaction of an employee's every desire." Clarian provided Tyson with several spaces in the hospital where she could pray and allowed her to do so during work hours while she was on duty. According to the evidence, the only limit Clarian placed on Tyson's religious practice was the requirement that she notify Rios when she went to pray. As a matter of law, Clarian provided reasonable accommodation for prayer. The same cannot be said, however, concerning Tyson's practice of ablution. At issue is the third element of the prima facie test-whether Tyson has come forward with sufficient evidence to suggest that her practice of ablution was the basis for an adverse personnel action. According to Clarian, Tyson was fired because she accumulated three relatively serious disciplinary violations within the probationary period of her employment. However, one of the violations was the disputed shower incident where Tyson has alleged that she was performing ablution in the shower of an empty patient room. Tyson contends that, to the extent Clarian based its decision to terminate her on this incident, she was in effect discharged for engaging in a religious practice, specifically ablution. Clarian's position is that regardless of Tyson's activities in the shower, it was a serious breach of hospital policy for her to be using a patient room shower without permission for any reason.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Tyson, her religious practice of ablution was at least a factor, and more likely the decisive factor, in Clarian's decision to fire her. Tyson has met her burden of establishing a prima facie case that Clarian failed to accommodate her religiou s practices. Clarian seems to view the Islamic practices of prayer and ablution as one religious practice that it reasonably accommodated by offering to let Tyson pray in the hospital's non-denominational chapels and basement. It is true that Tyson performed ablution in the basement and public restrooms of the hospital, but the record also contains evidence indicating that these venues were ill-suited for her needs. She testified that the sinks in public restrooms were too high for her to be able to wash her feet. The record is sparse regarding the precise practical requirements of ablution. The court does not find as a matter of law that Clarian provided Tyson with a reasonable accommodation for her religious practice of ablution. In this respect, summary judgment on Tyson's accommodation claim is DENIED.

1. Does this situation surprise you? Think about it. How much of your reaction is based on rejection of the situation itself, and how much is based on your discomfort with customs different from what you may be used to?

2. We had a student who confronted this situation during a summer internship when she walked into the bathroom and a Muslim employee was standing on the bathroom counter performing ablutions. What should be done about the discomfort of those not of the same religion?

3. As the employer, explore how you feel about having to accommodate religious practice differences. If your feelings run toward resentment, keep this in mind as you run into religious conflicts at work that must be accommodated.