Question: In which of the following cases, did the Court's majority opinion claim that the statute was content-based as compared to content-neutral. A law is content-based if it restricts speech either on the basis of its subject matter (allowing speech on some topics but not others) or its viewpoint (allowing speech expressing some positions but not others). Content-based restrictions must meet strict scrutiny (that is, be necessary to achieve a compelling government interest), while content-neutral laws only have to meet intermediate scrutiny (that is, be substantially related to achieving an important government interest). Write CN or CB next to the selection.

1. Hill v. Colorado (2000)-The Court concluded that the statute "is not a regulation of speech. Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur." "Although the statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from anyone passing by.
2. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota (1992)-Under the ordinance, for example, one could hold up a sign declaring all anti-Semites are badwords but not that all Jews are bad words.
3. Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993)-the Court found that the Wisconsin statute paralleled antidiscrimination laws which had been found to comply with the First Amendment. It also determined that the consequences for the victim and the community tended to be more severe, when the victim of a crime was chosen on account of his or her race. Thus, when the Wisconsin statute increased the sentence for such crimes, it was not punishing the defendant for his or her bigoted beliefs or statements, but rather the predicted ramifications of his or her crime.
4. Texas v. Johnson (1989)-The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that "[I]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."
5. Virginia v. Black (2003) - the Court held that while a State, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate, the provision in the Virginia statute treating any cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate renders the statute unconstitutional in its current form.