Question: Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security 489 U.S. 829 (1989)

Unemployment compensation was denied to an applicant who refused a temporary retail position because he would not work on Sundays for religious reasons. The Court held that the fact that the applicant did not belong to a particular religious organization did not mean he could not claim his religious freedom had been abridged.

White, J.

Frazee refused a temporary retail position offered him by Kelly Services because the job would have required him to work on Sunday. Frazee told Kelly that, as a Christian, he could not work on "the Lord's day." Frazee applied to the Illinois Department of Employment Security for unemployment benefits claiming there was good cause for his refusal to work on Sunday. His application was denied. Frazee appealed the denial of benefits to the Case3 Department's Board of Review, which also denied his claim. The Board of Review stated: "When a refusal of work is based on religious convictions, the refusal must be based upon some tenets or dogma accepted by the individual of some church, sect, or denomination, and such a refusal based solely on an individual's personal belief is personal and noncompelling and does not render the work unsuitable." To the Illinois court, Frazee's position that he was "a Christian" and as such felt it wrong to work on Sunday was not enough. For a Free Exercise Clause claim to succeed, said the Illinois Appellate Court, "the injunction against Sunday labor must be found in a tenet or dogma of an established religious sect.

Frazee does not profess to be a member of any such sect." The courts below did not question his sincerity, and the State concedes it. Furthermore, the Board of Review characterized Frazee's views as "religious convictions," and the Illinois Appellate Court referred to his refusal to work on Sunday as based on a "personal professed religious belief." Frazee asserted that he was a Christian, but did not claim to be a member of a particular Christian sect. It is also true that there are assorted Christian denominations that do not profess to be compelled by their religion to refuse Sunday work, but this does not diminish Frazee's protection flowing from the Free Exercise Clause. Undoubtedly, membership in an organized religious denomination, especially one with a specific tenet forbidding members to work on Sunday, would simplify the problem of identifying sincerely held religious beliefs, but we reject the notion that, to claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious organization. Here, Frazee's refusal was based on a sincerely held religious belief. Under our cases, he was entitled to invoke First Amendment protection. REVERSED and REMANDED.

1. As the employer here, how could you stay within the law and still have a policy in the best interest of your company?

2. If you were Kelly Services, what would you have done to avoid a conflict with Frazee?

3. As an employer, would you be concerned about how you could tell when an employee had a right to be protected under the law and when an employee was simply trying to get out of work? What would you do about it?