Question: Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos 483 U.S. 327 (1987)

Employee terminated from his job as a janitor in a church-owned gym brought suit for religious discrimination under Title VII. The U.S. Supreme Court held that applying the religious exemption to Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination in employment to secular nonprofit activities of religious organization did not violate the U.S. Constitution's Establishment Clause. That is, it is not a violation of Title VII for a religious employer to discriminate against employees on the basis of religion, even if the employees are not performing strictly religious functions.

White, J.

Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempts religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition against discrimination in employment on the basis of religion. The question presented is whether applying the exemption to the secular nonprofit activities of religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court held that it does. We reverse. The Deseret Gymnasium (Gymnasium) in Salt Lake City, Utah, is a nonprofit facility, open to the public, run by religious entities associated with The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church), an unincorporated religious association sometimes called the Mormon or LDS Church. Employee Mayson worked at the Gymnasium for some 16 years as an assistant building engineer and then as building engineer. He was discharged in 1981 because he failed to qualify for a temple recommend, that is, a certificate that he is a member of the Church and eligible to attend its temples. Temple recommends are issued only to individuals who observe the Church's standards in such matters as regular church attendance, tithing, and abstinence from coffee, tea, alcohol, and tobacco. Mayson brought an action against the Church alleging, among other things, discrimination on the basis of religion in violation of § 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Church moved to dismiss this claim on the ground that § 702 shields them from liability.

The employees contended that if construed to allow religious employers to discriminate on religious grounds in hiring for nonreligious jobs, the exemption of § 702 violates the Establishment Clause. It is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious. The line is hardly a bright one, and an organization might understandably be concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission. Fear of potential liability might affect the way an organization carried out what it understood to be its religious mission. Congress's purpose was to minimize governmental "interfer[ence] with the decision-making process in religions." We agree that this purpose does not violate the Establishment Clause. The religious groups have been better able to advance their purposes on account of many laws that have passed constitutional muster. A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have forbidden "effects," it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence. The case before us involves a nonprofit activity instituted over 75 years ago in the hope that "all who assemble here, and who come for the benefit of their health, and for physical blessings, [may] feel that they are in a house dedicated to the Lord." Dedicatory Prayer for the Gymnasium. Mayson was not legally obligated to take the steps necessary to qualify for a temple recommend, and his discharge was not required by statute.

We find no merit in his contention that § 702 "impermissibly delegates governmental power to religious employees and conveys a message of governmental endorsement of religious discrimination." § 702 is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of alleviating significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions. It cannot be seriously contended that § 702 impermissibly entangles church and state; the statute effectuates a more complete separation of the two and avoids intrusive inquiry into religious belief. The statute easily passes muster. REVERSED and REMANDED.

1. Are you surprised at the outcome of this case? Why?

2. As a church employer in your religion, what reason would you give for requiring that the building engineer be of the same religion?

3. Are you able to draw a bright line between excessive interference with church business and the government wanting to ensure employment protection for all? Explain.