Question: McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 411 U.S. 792 (1973)

Green, an employee of McDonnell Douglas and a black civil rights activist, engaged with others in "disruptive and illegal activity" against his employer in the form of a traffic stall-in. The activity was done as part of Green's protest that his discharge from McDonnell Douglas was racially motivated, as were the firm's general hiring practices. McDonnell Douglas later rejected Green's reemployment application on the ground of the illegal conduct. Green sued, alleging race discrimination. The case is important because it is the first time the U.S. Supreme Court set forth how to prove a disparate treatment case under Title VII. In such cases the employee can use an inference of discrimination drawn from a set of inquiries the Court set forth.

Powell, J.
The critical issue before us concerns the order and allocation of proof in a private, nonclass action challenging employment discrimination. The language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens. The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing

(i) that he belongs to a racial minority;

(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;

(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and

(iv) that, after his rejection,

the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification of the prima facie proof required from Green is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations. In the instant case, Green proved a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas sought mechanics, Green's trade, and continued to do so after Green's rejection. McDonnell Douglas, moreover, does not dispute Green's qualifications and acknowledges that his past work performance in McDonnell Douglas' employ was "satisfactory." The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.

We need not attempt to detail every matter which fairly could be recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire. Here McDonnell Douglas has assigned Green's participation in unlawful conduct against it as the cause for his rejection. We think that this suffices to discharge McDonnell Douglas' burden of proof at this stage and to meet Green's prima facie case of discrimination. But the inquiry must not end here. While Title VII does not, without more, compel the rehiring of Green, neither does it permit McDonnell Douglas to use Green's conduct as a pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by Title VII. On remand, Green must be afforded a fair opportunity to show that McDonnell Douglas' stated reason for Green's rejection was in fact pretext.

Especially relevant to such a showing would be evidence that white employees involved in acts against McDonnell Douglas of comparable seriousness to the "stall-in" were nevertheless retained or rehired. McDonnell Douglas may justifiably refuse to rehire one who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against it, but only if this criterion is applied alike to members of all races. Other evidence that may be relevant to any showing of pretext includes facts as to McDonnell Douglas' treatment of Green during his prior term of employment; McDonnell Douglas' reaction, if any, to Green's legitimate civil rights activities; and McDonnell Douglas' general policy and practice with respect to minority employment.

On the latter point, statistics as to McDonnell Douglas' employment policy and practice may be helpful to a determination of whether McDonnell Douglas' refusal to rehire Green in this case conformed to a general pattern of discrimination against blacks. The District Court may, for example, determine after reasonable discovery that "the [racial] composition of defendant's labor force is itself reflective of restrictive or exclusionary practices." We caution that such general determinations, while helpful, may not be in and of themselves controlling as to an individualized hiring decision, particularly in the presence of an otherwise justifiable reason for refusing to rehire. In short, on the retrial Green must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a cover up for a racially discriminatory decision. VACATED and REMANDED.

1. Do you think the Court should require actual evidence of discrimination in disparate treatment cases rather than permitting an inference? What are the advantages? Disadvantages?

2. Practically speaking, is an employer's burden really met after the employer "articulates" a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the employee? Explain.

3. Does the Court say that Green must be kept on in spite of his illegal activities? Discuss.