Question: Dr. Mind, a prominent psychiatrist at the Mensa Medical Center, a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Hospital, treated Ms. Puppet for anxiety and panic disorder. Dr. Mind used recognized techniques for treating Ms. Puppet, including medication, psychotherapy, and hypnosis. During the many hypnosis sessions, Dr. Mind began a sexual relationship with Ms. Puppet. She did not remember having relations with Dr. Mind, as Dr. Mind, during hypnosis, had instructed her to have no memory of her thoughts. On one occasion, however, Ms. Puppet noticed that, after she left Dr. Mind's office, her undergarments were on backwards and her skirt was not buttoned properly. She became suspicious of Dr. Mind, so she forced herself to not fall into a hypnotic state at her next session with Dr. Mind. At this session, when Dr. Mind believed Ms. Puppet was in a hypnotic state, he began undressing her.
She then broke her silence, confronted him, and left his office. Following the confrontation, Dr. Mind was placed on paid administrative leave pending an investigation, which resulted in his admission of guilt and termination. Ms. Puppet then sued the United States, because the actions occurred at a VA hospital, under the Federal Torts Claim Act (28 U.S.C. Section 2675[a]). Ms. Puppet's attorney argued that Dr. Mind's acts took place during regularly scheduled therapy sessions, during working hours, and in an office provided to Dr. Mind by the VA hospital. Accordingly, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the United States was liable for Dr. Mind's acts. The United States contended that it was not liable because Dr. Mind's motives were not intended to benefit the employee and that criminal and/or tortuous acts clearly fall outside the scope of employment.
Case Questions
1. Is the United States liable based on a theory that the wrongful acts of Dr. Mind took place within the scope of his employment?
2. What other theories may apply, such as the foreseeability of transference?
3. What can employers do to prevent such wrongful acts?
For helpful information on this situation, see the basis for the hypothetical case: Doe v. United States of America (912 F. Supp. 193 [E.D. Va. 1995]). Also, for study of transference, see Allen (2003). expenses to relocate back to his hometown and required him to sign an employment agreement that contained a noncompetition provision. Being a trusting person, Dr. Zhivago did not seek an attorney's advice before signing the agreement. After several years of working at this practice, Dr. Zhivago fell in love with a patient who resided in another small town about 30 miles away. After this patient's recovery, Dr. Zhivago proposed marriage and agreed to move and to work in his fiancé's hometown. He opened a private practice in this town.
After giving notice to his employer, however, Dr. Zhivago received a stern letter from the employer's counsel, reminding him of his employment agreement. The agreement's noncompetition provision prevented him from working as a thoracic surgeon within a 60-mile radius of his current employer for one year after leaving employment. Given the rural nature of the community, Dr. Zhivago was the only thoracic surgeon within a 90-mile radius of either practice. He would have to move to the big city to practice medicine, leaving all the residents of his hometown (as well as those of his new wife's hometown) without a practicing thoracic surgeon.