[Engineer S_ was suspended from work for one year for operating rules violations regarding his handling of his train's speed in the descent of the Cajon Pass east of San Bernardino, California, on March 8, 1998. The matter was appealed to a Public Law Board, whose binding decision was rendered on June 5, 2001.]

On the Cajon Subdivision, trains are required to maintain certain speeds while descending the steep grade at Cajon Pass west of Summit depending on the tonnage of the train and braking capacity according to the requirements set forth in Division Time Table No. 2 in effect October 1, 1996. On March 8, 1998, Engineer S_ and Conductor Klatt operated [their train] from Barstow to Los Angeles. Some 10 days later, ... they were contacted by Road Foreman of Engines J.L. Worcester who was investigating the speed of their train between Cajon and Baseline on March 8, 1998. Engineer S_ was held out of service soon after his discussions with Mr. Worcester.

The record reveals that the speed of westbound trains operating over the Cajon Pass are subject to strict scrutiny by the Carrier, and it is well known by all employees operating in this area that event recorders will be read for train speed by a Carrier official for all westbound trains operating over the Cajon Pass. Both Engineer S_ and Conductor Klatt testified that they used the Carrier rules and the paperwork given for their train in Barstow on March 8, 1998 to determine what speed to operate down the Cajon Pass. They both testified that they determined their train was a "15-30" train, meaning that their train travelling on the south track from Summit to Cajon was to operate at 15 mph, and from Cajon to Baseline the train was to operate at 30 mph. Were their train to be over 6,500 tons, under the speed regulations set forth in Division Timetable No. 2, they would be required to operate at 20 mph from Cajon to Baseline. Conductor Klatt testified in part in response to questions from the Hearing Officer:

Q There's been an awful lot of testimony here and many, many exhibits about this train and other trains and how the computer system works. And Mr. Martin, who I would consider an expert, said for the record that no information that he saw would tend to make myself or anyone reading the transcript think that your train was less than 6,500 tons. Is there anything that comes to your mind that would tend to-that needs to be entered in here today that would make me think otherwise?

A The only thing that I could add is that, when I get there and do my signal awareness form what we qualify for in the back there, and I do fill those out and turn them in. As new as I am and as cautious as I am, I know I did it. And I haven't had one engineer yet that hasn't asked me "What did you get?" And if there is a discrepancy between us two, then we go back and figure it out what it is before we even leave the lobby. And I know that S_ and I had done that. Q S_ is? A S_. I know S_ and I did that before we left the lobby. Even as we're going along before we go down the hill, I still open up my book to make sure what we are just because I'm new. I just want to make sure.

There is no question that the crew believed that their train was a "15-30" train, not a "15-20" train. Indeed, Road Foreman of Engines J.L. Worcester testified in part that the crew had run the train as though they had a train under 6,500 tons as follows: Q Do you have the same list that the train crew had? A No, I do not. Q Did they operate that train between Summit and Baseline on the south track as if they had had a train under 6,500 tons? A Yes.

A fair and proper evaluation of whether or not Engineer S_ exceeded the proper speed in violation of the Carrier rules requires a review of the paperwork that Conductor and Engineer used on March 8, 1998 to determine the speed for the Cajon Pass.... The Hearing Officer questioned Engineer S_ as follows: Q Okay. And, again, besides Exhibit C, which is the list you're talking about, all the other exhibits, the AEI scanners, the archive, the files of train lists, the Train Event, is any of that information ever less than 6,500 tons? A I wouldn't know.

I don't even know-I have never seen any of that information or how to obtain it before.... All of the other exhibits referred to by the Hearing Officer had no meaning to Engineer S_. A mountain of printouts cannot substitute for the critical documents that were not produced in this case-the train list with the train profile which the crew members used to determine the appropriate speed to descend the Cajon Pass. It may well be that the train in fact was over 6,500 tons. But the crew is only responsible for the Rules violations charged if the information providedthem on the train list and train profile at Barstow on March 8, 1998 showed the train to be over 6,500 tons.

In the instant case, Mr. Martin testified that there was no way to go back into the computer system and print out a copy of the list that would have been given the crew on March 8, 1998 in Barstow. And the record reveals that the crew members do not keep this paperwork in the ordinary course of their duties for the Carrier, nor has any requirement been shown that such paperwork should be turned into the Carrier. Conductor Klatt testified that he turned into the Carrier his Signal Awareness Form on which he recorded his figures in determining the speed for the train.... And Mr. Klatt testified that the figures from the train list to determine the speed was what he "input on my signal awareness form."

Such a document would be relevant and material in this case, but it was not produced by the Carrier. It is evident that compliance with speed regulations over the Cajon Pass is a most serious matter to the Carrier, for improper speed can lead to a catastrophe. And the matter of discipline for a speed violation to an employee is a most serious matter. In the instant case Engineer S_ was suspended from service without pay from March 16, 1998 through March 15, 1999, with a three year probation period. Thetakes are high for the Carrier and the employee. All parties concerned are genuinely interested in the fairness of the disciplinary system. As set forth initially the Carrier has the burden of proof. We find it has failed to meet that burden of proof in this case.

Case Questions

1. Did the carrier produce evidence that the train was operating at an excessive speed considering the weight of the train? Did the Board find that the carrier met its burden of proof?

2. If the train was operated 10 miles per hour over the speed limit from Cajon to Baseline in violation of company operating rules and the speed set forth in the division timetable, is a oneyear suspension an appropriate penalty for the engineer? Give the carrier's view on this matter. State the union's view. What did the Board say about this matter?