Case Study- Ford Pinto
In the late 1960s, Ford designed a subcompact, the Pinto, weighed less than 2,000 pounds and sold for less than $ 2,000. Anxious to compete with foreign-made subcompacts, Ford brought the car into production in slightly more than 2 years (compared with the usual 3 ½ years). Given this shorter time frame, styling preceded much of the engineering, thus restricting engineering design more than usual. As a result, it was decided that the best place for the gas tank was between the rear axle and the bumper. The differential housing had exposed bolt heads that could puncture the gas tank if the tank were driven forward against them upon rear impact. In court, the crash tests were described as follows:
These prototypes as well as two production Pintos were crash tested by Ford to determine, among other things, the integrity of the fuel system in rear- end accidents.... Prototypes struck from the rear with a moving barrier at 21- miles- per- hour caused the fuel tank to be driven forward and to be punctured, causing fuel leakage.... A production Pinto crash tested at 21- miles- per- hour into a fixed barrier caused the fuel tank to be torn from the gas tank and the tank to be punctured by a bolt head on the differential housing. In at least one test, spilled fuel entered the driver's compartment. Ford also tested rear impact when rubber bladders were installed in the tank, as well as when the tank was located above rather than behind the rear axle. Both passed the 20- mile- per- hour rear impact tests. Although the federal government was pressing to stiffen regulations on gas tank designs, Ford contented that the Pinto met all applicable federal safety standards at the time. J. C. Echold, director of automotive safety for Ford, issued a study titled "Fatalities Associated with Crash Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires." This study claimed that the costs of improving the design ($ 11 per vehicle) outweighed its social benefits. A memorandum attached to the report described the costs and benefits as follows:
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Benefits
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Savings
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180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, 2,100 burned vehicles
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Unit cost
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$ 200,000 per death, $ 67,000 per injury, $ 700 per vehicle
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Total benefits
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180 x $ 200,000 + 180 $ x 67,000 + 2100 x $ 700 = $ 49.15 million
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Costs
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Sales
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11 million cars, 1.5 million light trucks
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Unit cost
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$ 11 per car, $ 11 per truck
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Total costs
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11,000,000 x $ 11 + 1,500,000 x $ 11 = $ 137 million
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The estimate of the number of deaths, injuries, and damage to vehicles was based on statistical studies. The $ 200,000 for the loss of a human life was based on an NHTSA study, which estimated social costs of a death as follows:
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Cost Component
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1971 Costs
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Future productivity losses
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Direct $ 132,000 + Indirect $ 41,300
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Medical costs
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Hospital $700 + Other $425
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Property damage + Insurance administration
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$1,500 + $4,700
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Legal and court
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$3000
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Employer losses
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$1,000
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Victim's pain and suffering
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$10,000
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Funeral
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$900
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Assets ( lost consumption) + Misc.
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5000 + 200
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Total per fatality
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$ 200,725
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Report Assignment:
Discuss the appropriateness of using data such as these in Ford's decision regarding whether or not to make a safety improvement in its engineering design. If you believe this is not appropriate, what would you suggest as an alternative? What responsibilities do you think engineers have in situations like this?
(1) "Engineering Ethics - Concepts and Cases", Harris et. al, Cengage, 5th ed.