Choose the best answer.

1. In what sense might the philosophies of Frege and Russell appear "rather highfalutin"?

(a) they make unjustified assumptions about foundational concepts such as meaning, reference, and truth conditions.

(b) they fail to make use the resources of contemporary logic and for that reason are imprecise

(c) they are largely a collection of unmotivated theories for which no arguments or illustrations are offered

2. What is Quine's main project in the philosophy of language?

(a) to avoid making the sorts of unjustified assumptions made by Frege and Russell

(b) to attempt to approach the study of language from the point of view of natural science

(c) both (a) and (b)

3. What did Frege and Russell say or assume about the concepts of meaning, grasping propositions, reference, and truth conditions?

(a) their existence and explanatory value could be presupposed or established by a priori reasoning

(b) they were scientifically credible; they could be vindicated by the relevant sorts of observations

(c) they were concepts in dire need of analysis

4. What does it mean to say, in the spirit of Quine, that a theory of natural language should be an "empirical" theory?

(a) it should be based on the relevant sort of observable evidence: the behavior of language speakers

(b) it should be articulated in the precise and exact languages of mathematics and logic

(c) it should be developed and defended by philosophers of science, not philosophers of language

5. What, in essence, is Quine's view of the concept of meaning?

(a) it has no scientific credibility: it is not objective

(b) it has practical value: it serves various purposes in our day-to-day lives, as can be seen from our frequent use of the notion of meaning, as when we ask, for example, "What did you mean by that?" or "What does this sentence mean?"

(c) both (a) and (b)

6. What is Quinean "naturalism"?

(a) Philosophy should be eliminated as its theories are not based on observable evidence

(b) It is science, not philosophy, that sets the standards for what can be known and for what is real.

(c) Meaning is a credible notion only insofar as it is amenable to scientific investigation

7. In what sense is a theory of meaning (of the sort that Frege, for example, attempted to construct) akin to astrology and homeopathy, according to the Quinean?

(a) it doesn't appear amenable to the investigative tools of contemporary natural science

(b) it is based on a priori reasoning and conceptual analysis

(c) it has no obvious relevance to real life; it provides no guidance

8. What does the Quinean mean when he/she says that meaning is "not something objective"?

(a) the assignment of particular meanings to particular expressions depends on the interests of the members of the linguistic community who use those expressions

(b) the assignment of particular meanings to particular expressions is not something that could be validated by the impersonal procedures of science

(c) both (a) and (b)

9. How is it possible, according to Quine, to answer questions about the meaning of an expression if there is no objective, scientifically credible, notion of meaning?

(a) one might mention a word/phrase that could be used in place of the word/phrase whose meaning is being queried; alternatively, one might direct the inquirer, not to another appropriate word/phrase, but rather to the sorts of objects or individuals referred to by the word/phrase in question

(b) one might use analogies or illustrations; alternatively, one might provide examples of sentences where the word whose meaning is being queried is used correctly

(c) there are many ways to do this, including those specified in (a) and (b) above.

10. What does Kemp mean when he says, paraphrasing Quine, that "giving the meaning of a word or phrase" is "a profoundly useful but ultimately imprecise service, not so much a science as an art."

(a) it is a service that philosophers, rather than scientists, should perform

(b) while the service performed by lexicographers is useful for those who consult dictionaries in search of word meanings, the methods used to arrive at dictionary definitions of words are not scientifically credible.

(c) although it is often useful to have answers to questions about the meanings of particular words or phrases, those purported meanings do not capture any sort of objective, interest-free, phenomena discoverable via the methods and procedures of contemporary science.

11. Which of the following is an example of what Hume would call a "relation of ideas"?

(a) All squares have four sides

(b) There are now more philosophy majors than math majors at U of A

(c) Social Sciences 206 is where Philosophy 376 was held this semester

12. Which of the following is an example of what Hume would call a "matter of fact"?

(a) University of Arizona is in Tucson

(b) University of Arizona is a university

(c) 14x7=98

13. Which of the following is an example of an analytic statement?

(a) A canary is a bird

(b) I own two canaries

(c) Some Tucsonans own canaries

14. Why does Quine think there is no role for the notion of analyticity in philosophy?

(a) Because it's a superfluous notion; all we need to explain truth are the notions of logical truths and synthetic truths.

(b) Because it's defined in terms of the concept of meaning, and the concept of meaning is not amenable to scientific investigation and for that reason lacks the objectivity required of credible philosophical concepts.

(c) Quine does think analyticity has a role in philosophy! After all, his most famous paper, "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism" was largely about the analytic/synthetic distinction.

15. What is Quine getting at when he famously compares our body of knowledge to a "man-made fabric"?

(a) Our beliefs are not to be understood or evaluated individually but rather as parts of an integrated whole, so that a change in one belief may necessitate adjusting individual "threads" (beliefs) elsewhere in our fabric of belief.

(b) With the discovery of new and revolutionary beliefs, it is possible that our entire fabric of belief may unravel, necessitating the weaving together of an entirely new belief system.

(c) Our belief system, which is something we weave together as a society, is not something that has any sort of objective standing: it is, in essence, a social construct rather than a scientific one.

16. Does Quine believe that no statement is immune to revision? Does he think that any statement may be held "come what may"?

(a) yes and yes

(b) no and no

(c) yes and no

PART 2: WITTEN GENSTEIN

Imagine you are a fan of Wittgenstein's views on language; how might you answer the following questions, posed by a fan of the opposing Frege/Russell view of language?

1. What is the main theme of the Investigations? What, in other words, is Wittgenstein's "philosophy of language"?

(a) the foundational concept that should guide any exploration into the nature of language is the concept of truth

(b) language is too complex a phenomenon to be captured by an artificially imposed "grid" of generalizations about reference, meaning, and understanding

(c) the key to understanding the nature of language is to figure out how to best define the key concepts of reference, meaning, and understanding

2. What's Wittgenstein's gripe with the wonderfully clear and informative dictum that understanding a sentence involves grasping its meaning?

(a) it misrepresents the multidimensional nature of understanding

(b) it misconstrues understanding as something "all or nothing" rather than as something that admits of degrees

(c) both (a) and (b)

3. What are some examples of language-games, other than the ones Gary Kemp mentions?

(a) gossiping and interviewing for a job

(b) surfing and backpacking

(c) greeting and haggling

4. What fundamental aspects of language are captured in the notion of a language-game?

(a) the use of words is governed by rules, just like the use of game pieces

(b) in the case of both language and games, there are endless opportunities for creativity: for genuine choice regarding what "moves" we can make make while playing by the rules of the game

(c) both (a) and (b)

5. Could you please illustrate the frustratingly vague notion of a "form of life"?

(a) it's kind of like what people mean when they talk about a "life-style," which often concerns such things as one dietary, exercise, and leisure activities

(b) it's pretty self-explanatory: a form of life is a life form, of which there are two basic sorts: plant and animal

(c) it refers to a human activity that often involves language (e.g., debating) but that needn't involve (e.g., surfing)

6. Wittgenstein suggests that characterizations of broad notions like 'refers' and 'meaning' reflect an undesirable "craving for generality." What is he getting at?

(a) such characterizations conceal important differences between linguistic phenomena (reference, meaning) while highlighting superficial similarities

(b) such characterizations satisfy the distinctively philosophical, and intellectually respectable, desire to capture the essence of important concepts in the philosophy of language

(c) philosophers are especially adept at analyzing notions like reference and meaning, thereby satisfying the craving so many of have to understand

7. Wittgenstein says that language proficiency is a matter of degree. Can you explain that to me?

(a) language proficiency is not an "all-or-nothing" skill; if you are proficient in a language (in "language games"), you may be more proficient than some people (e.g., your toddler cousins) and less proficient than other people (e.g., your middle-aged parents)

(b) there is no point in time at which we can say of someone that they are a "master of language"

(c) both (a) and (b)

8. Can you please illustrate the idea that the language learning involves many kinds of capacities?

(a) think about the capacities involved in being a pupil at a school; knowing how to conduct yourself in such a setting involves more than the capacity to speak grammatical sentences that employ an age-appropriate vocabulary; you need how and when to employ such sentences when interacting with your teacher and fellow pupils

(b) think about the capacities involved in taking (and doing well on) this exam: you need the capacity to understand the questions that you encounter as well the capacity to figure out what the professor might mean by those questions, and whether some of them might be "trick" questions

(c) think about the capacities involved in learning a second language: not only are there a zillion words whose meanings you have to memorize, and impossible grammatical rules that you have to memorize, you also have to get the accent right!

9. I find Wittgenstein's views really confusing, so let me begin with a really simple question: What, on Wittgenstein's view, is the essence of language?

(a) language has no essence if having an essence means that there is some particular property that is shared by all (and only) languages

(b) reference, meaning, and understanding - just like Frege and Russell thought!

(c) its unique capacity to express truths about the world

10. What does Wittgenstein mean by a "family resemblance" concept?

(a) it is a concept that incorporates phenomena that a related to one another not in virtue of some shared "essence," but rather in virtue of a variety of overlapping resemblances

(b) it is a concept that captures the essential similarities between members of a particular group

(c) it is a concept that refers to the sorts of shared features often seen in members of a single family: eyes, nose, mouth, hair, build,

11. Wittgenstein famously illustrates the notion of "family resemblance" by suggesting that that concept of a game is a family resemblance concept. What are some examples of games and the family-like resemblances they share?

(a) tag, rock-paper-scissors, hide-and-seek: all can be played by very young children

(b) chess, checkers, monopoly: all involve a board and pieces

(c) both (a) and (b)

12. In what sense is the concept of language itself a family resemblance concept?

(a) no one thing is common to the various activities we characterize by means of the word "language"

(b) like organic (naturally developing) cities, things we call "languages" evolved over time and cannot be understood by the imposition of a "grid" - which, in the case of languages, would amount to superficial generalizations about meaning, reference, understanding, etc.

(c) both (a) and (b)

13. What does Wittgenstein mean when he suggests that learning a language is a piecemeal business?

(a) learning a language involves leaning how to "play" a wide variety language games, and these games (asking a parent permission to do something, talking with parents of your friends, interacting appropriately with teachers and fellow students, ordering dinner at a restaurant, purchasing tickets at a movie theatre, etc.) are not learned all at once but over time, and in the appropriate sorts of social contexts

(b) generally speaking, you don't learn different languages at the same time unless your parents speak to you in more than one language; you might learn Spanish first, and then Japanese, and then Swahili!

(c) it's not as though you are born knowing the language you now speak. You learn the grammatical rules and individual words that define your language over a period of decades - you can even learn new words when you are a hundred!

14. Why doesn't Wittgenstein give precedence to the fact-stating use of language, like Frege and Russell do? After all, truth is of fundamental importance to philosophy and it is by way of fact-stating language that we are able to express truths.

(a) Have you not read the Tractatus?!

(b) Why should he? His primary interest is in the nature of language, not the nature of truth and we can use language to do so much more than state facts!

(c) He recognizes that truth is not the all-important concept that it's cracked up to be - especially when compared to beauty love, and friendship!

15. What does Wittgenstein mean when he says that to ask about the meaning of an expression is to ask about its use?

(a) a good lexicographer will make sure that the entries in their dictionary reflect the ways in which the words defined are used in the linguistic community

(b) he's basically saying that the statement "meaning = use" is an analytic truth: it's true in virtue of the meaning of 'meaning'

(c) when we ask what an expression means we really want to know is how it is used in our linguistic community

16. Could you please explain the basic idea behind Wittgenstein's famous "language as a toolbox" analogy?

(a) language is like a toolbox insofar as the tools it contains are much like the words contained in the language we speak: just as the significance of individual words ('language', 'game', 'philosopher') is a matter of how they are used, so too the significance of individual tools (hammer, saw, screwdriver) is a matter of how they are used

(b) language is like a toolbox insofar as the tools it contains are much like the words contained in the language we speak: some are used more frequently than others, some are never used at all, and some have uses we weren't even aware of!

(c) language is like a toolbox insofar as the tools it contains are much like the words contained in the language we speak: as with words, tools possess a special "essence" that defines their meaning or significance

17. Gary Kemp mentions a specific limit to Wittgenstein's "language as a toolbox" analogy. Can you explain to me what that limit is?

(a) there are purposes served by language (such as thinking) that cannot be explained without reference to language

(b) there are no purposes served by particular tools (hammer, saw, rake) that cannot be explained without reference to those tools

(c) (a) yet (b)