Question: To the extent that the majority suggests that a statutory classification may pass constitutional muster if it promotes any legitimate state purpose, related to the statute or not, I strongly disagree. Under such a standard, any legislative classification that exempts a particular class of persons from legislation would be constitutional, because the state always has a legitimate interest in relieving its citizens of the costs and burdens of state regulation. Although it is well established that courts must give great deference to legislative classifications, it has never been suggested that we should give absolute deference to the legislature. If, for example, the legislature had determined that, in order to reduce the burdens imposed by [the smoking ban], cafés and restaurants located in towns whose names contain an even number of letters would be exempt from the statute, surely that arbitrary classification could not be saved by the fact that it promoted a legitimate public interest. In my view, the trial court, the defendants and the majority all have failed to articulate any ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of [the smoking ban].

Instead, they simply have begged the question by assuming that any difference between disparately treated classes justifies the disparate treatment. The defendants concede, and there is no dispute, that "the intent of [the smoking ban] was to protect employees, especially those with little choice as to where they work, from being subjected to exposure to carcinogenic secondhand smoke as a condition of their employment." I cannot conceive of any rational relationship between this purpose and providing an exemption for establishments that purportedly were founded with the expectation that smoking would continue to be permitted there. There is no evidence in the record that private clubs have fewer employees than the establishments that are subject to the act or that their employees are somehow less susceptible to the ill effects of secondhand smoke than other employees. Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence in the record that the members of the private clubs formed or invested in the clubs with the expectation that smoking would be allowed there or, if they did, that any such expectation was reasonable. Clubs generally are subject to the same laws as other employers [and the] defendants have cited no authority for the proposition that unfounded expectations of privacy can form a constitutional basis for a legislative classification.

1 LAW. What did the majority conclude on the central question in this case, and what points supported this conclusion?

2 LAW. What was the dissent's analysis with regard to the question?

3 POLITICAL D IMENSIONS. To reach its conclusion, did the majority have to agree with the legislature's decision to exempt most private clubs from the smoking ban? Why or why not?

4 ECONOMIC D IMENSIONS. What are the likely economic effects of the outcome in this case? Explain.

5 IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYERS. What does the ruling in this case suggest to employers who are not yet subject to the smoking ban at issue?