Two firms dominate the instructional market for metal costing. These are DuPoint abs BASF. Each has similar costs and production facilities each must set its production (measyred in millions of tons) several months in advance so that the strategic variable for each is quantity. The BASF profit is given first in each payoff pair.
|
DuPoet's Production
|
|
BASF Production
|
30
|
40
|
50
|
60
|
|
30
|
$1700,$1700
|
$1300,$1900
|
$1000,$2000
|
$950,$1850
|
|
40
|
$1900,$1300
|
$1500,$1500
|
$1200,$1600
|
$1100,$1500
|
|
50
|
$2000,$1000
|
$1600,$1200
|
$1300,$1300
|
$1000,$1200
|
|
60
|
$1850,$950
|
$1500,$1100
|
$1200,$1000
|
$900,$900
|
a. What is the Nash Equilibrium output for his assuming that the two firms choose their production quantities simultaneously?
b. What would be the equilibrium if dupoint could choose its output first and BASF chose second, taking DuPoet's decision as given?