A firm produces output according to the production function Q=K^(1/2)L^(1/2). If it sells its output in a perfectly competitive market at a price of 10, and if K is fixed at 4 units, what is this firm's short-run demand curve for labor?

How would your answer to the preceding problem be different if the employer in question sold his product according to the demand schedule P = 20 - Q?

In his current job, Smith can work as many hours per day as he chooses, and he will be paid $1/hr for the first 8 hours he works, $2.50/hr for each hour over 8. Faced with this payment schedule, Smith chooses to work 12 hr/day. If Smith is offered a new job that pays $1.50/hr for as many hours as he chooses to work, will he take it? Explain.

Consider the following two antipoverty programs: (1) A payment of $10/day is to be given this year to each person who was classified as poor last year; and (2) each person classified as poor will be given a benefit equal to 20 percent of the wage income he earns each day this year. a. Assuming that poor persons have the options of working at $4/hr, show how each program would affect the daily budget constraint of a representative poor worker during the current year. b. Which program would be most likely to reduce the number of hours worked?

A monopsonist's demand curve for labor is given by w = 12 - 2L, where wis the hourly wage rate and L is the number of person-hours hired. a. If the monopsonist's supply (AFC) curve is given by w = 2L, which gives rise to a marginal factor cost curve of MFC = 4L, how many units of labor will he employ and what wage will he pay?b. How would your answers to part (a) be different if the monopsonist were confronted with a minimum wage bill requiring him to pay at least $7/hr? c. How would your answers to parts (a) and (b) be different if the employer in question were not a monopsonist but a perfect competitor in the market for labor?

Smith can produce with or without a filter on his smokestack. Production without a filter results in greater smoke damage to Jone. The relevant gains and losses are as follows: Gains to Smith: $200/wk with filter; $245/wk without filter. Damage to Jones: $35/wk with filter; $85/wk without filter. a. If Smith is not liable for smoke damage and there are no negotiation costs, will he install a filter? Explain carefully. b. How, if at all, would the outcome be different if Smith were liable for all smoke damage and the cost of the filter were $10/wk higher than indicated in the table? Explain carefully.