Little Kona is a small coffee corporation that is planning entering a market dominated through Big Brew. Each corporation's profit depends on whether Little Kona enters and whether Big Brew sets a high price or a low price:

Big Brew
High Price Low Price
Little Kona Enter ($2,$3)millions ($1,$1)millions
Little Kona Don't Enter ($0,$7)millions ($0,$2)millions

a. Does either player in this game have a dominant strategy?

b. Does your answer to part (a) help you figure out what the other player should do? What is the Nash equilibrium? Is there only one?

c. Big Brew threatens Little Kona by saying, "If you enter, we're going to set a low price, so you had better stay out." Do you think Little Kona should believe the threat? Why or why not?

d. If the two firms could collude and agree on how to split the total profits, what outcome would they pick?