Econ 521 - Week 1
1. Hawk-Dove
Two animals are fighting over some prey. Each can be passive or aggresive. Each prefers to be aggresive if its opponent is passive and passive if its opponent is aggressive; given its own stance, it prefers the outcome in which its opponent is passive to that in which its opponent is aggresive. Can this situation be represented as a game? Why? If the answer is yes, show how. If not, explain why.
2. Strict and Weak Dominance
For the following game, determine for each player whether any action is strictly dominated or weakly dominated. Solve the game using iterated strict dominance.
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2
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L
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C
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R
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1
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T
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0,0
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1,0
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1,1
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M
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1,1
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1,1
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3,0
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B
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1,1
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2,1
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2,2
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How does your answer change if now the game is the following:
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2
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L
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C
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R
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1
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T
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0,0
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1,0
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1,1
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M
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1,1
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1,1
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3,0
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B
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2,3
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2,1
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2,0
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3. Iterated elimination of dominated strategies
In the following game,
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2
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L
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C
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R
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1
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T
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1,1
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1,1
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0,0
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B
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0,0
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1,2
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1,2
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(a) Describe the set of actions that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions.
(b) Describe the set of actions that survive the iterated elimination of weakly dominated actions.
(c) Is there any difference between your answers in (a) and (b)? Explain.