1. Bicycle Insurance and Information Asymmetry

If bicycle owners do not know whether they are high-or low-risk consumers, is there an adverse selection problem?

2. Suppose that every driver faces a 1% probability of an automobile accident every year.  An accident will, on average, cost each driver $10,000.  Suppose there are two types of individuals: those with $60,000 in the bank and those with $5,000 in the bank.  Assume that individuals with $5,000 in the bank declare bankruptcy if they get in an accident.  In bankruptcy, creditors receive only what individuals have in the bank.  What is the actuarially fair price of insurance?  What price are individuals with $5,000 in the bank willing to pay for the insurance?  Will those with $5,000 in the bank voluntarily purchase insurance?

3. Describe a moral hazard problem your company is facing.  What is the source of the asymmetric information? Who is the less informed party? Are there any wealth-creating transactions not consummated as a result of the asymmetric information?  If so, could you consummate them? Compute the profit consequences of any advice.