ASSIGNMENT
In the table below, the payoffs for the Player 1 and Player 2 are given for a game. This is a simultaneous game where each player should simultaneously decide which one of the five options they would like to play. Player 1 can choose from the moves listed from A to E, and Player 2 can choose from the moves listed from V to Z. The pay-offs written in black refers to pay-offs of Player 1, and pay-offs indicated with red refers to pay-offs of Player 2. For instance, when Player 1 chooses to play B, while the Player 2 chooses to Play Y, Player 1 would lose 1 points, whereas Player 2 will neither gain nor lose any points.
Based on the information below,
a. Is there are any strictly dominating strategy for Player 1? Please also explain why/ why not there is a strictly dominating strategy?
b. Is there are any strictly dominating strategy for Player 2? Please also explain why/ why not there is a strictly dominating strategy?
c. Does iterated elimination of strictly dominating strategies method produce a strictly dominating strategy for this game? Please also explain why/ why not there is a dominant strategy by explaining the elimination steps and the logic behind it? (You need to explain the solution step by step just like it is explained in the video lecture that I posted on online education)
d. Are there are any Nash equilibrium solutions for this game? Please also explain why/why not there is Nash equilibrium solutions for this game.
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Player 2 (SHE)
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V
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W
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X
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Y
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Z
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Player 1 (HE)
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A
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4 , -1
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3, 0
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-3 , 1
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-1 , 4
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-2, 0
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B
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-1 , 1
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2 , 2
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2 , 3
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-1 , 0
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2 , 5
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C
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2 , 1
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-1 , -1
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0 , 4
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4 , -1
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0 , 2
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D
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1 , 6
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-3 , 0
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-1 , 4
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1 , 1
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-1 , 4
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E
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0 , 0
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1 , 4
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-3 , 1
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-2 , 3
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-1 , -1
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